Abstract: This paper focuses on the interplay between formal interorganisational networks and personal informal networks in IT innovation. It also explores the complementarities between two theoretical perspectives of social and economic networks. The context within which this research is located is Esprit, the European Strategic Programme for Research in IT. The empirical evidence is based on a success story of a UK main contractor in Esprit. The main finding is that formal collaboration networks in Esprit emerge out of informal personal networks, rather than vice versa. Stuart Macdonald is Professor of Information and Organisation at Sheffield University Management School. His research interests centre on the role of information in change, and particularly on how information for innovation is found, acquired and used. Current research looks at the information transaction between management consultants and their clients, and at the networking of small firms.
Introduction
For many years now, government policy has systematically encouraged collaboration among firms, universities and government organisations. Governments are keen on collaboration because they believe that it shares the costs and risks of expensive research and development, expands the knowledge base of participants through the gathering of complementary talents and capabilities, and creates innovation and competitiveness in an increasingly globalised economy. Where policy has led, company strategy has followed with a profusion of various sorts of alliances. Part of the explanation for the interest of policy and strategy in such linkages may be that the notion of network is eminently compatible with other notions of collective endeavour encouraged by current management methods. The network allows the guru, the consultant, the academic to burst free from organisational bounds and proffer advice on a wider stage. It allows manager and policy maker alike a flexibility that conventional distinctions, based on what is external to the organisation and what is internal, do not permit. Then again, interest in networks may simply be a passing fad. Such things are not unknown in the world of management [1] .
Esprit, the European Strategic Programme for Research in Information Technologies, provides an excellent example of the encouragement of collaboration; indeed, insistence on collaboration. It has funded thousands of formal, inter-organisational collaborations throughout European Union (EU) countries over the past 17 years (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , and has claimed all the advantages of collaboration for its innovation. But this very formal and compulsory collaboration has necessarily been superimposed on existing informal and personal networks of individuals involved in the European IT industry. These transcend the boundaries of formal collaboration and stretch out to individuals in other organisations and institutions, individuals who are sources of tacit information and embedded knowledge of great value to innovation. New non-linear theories of innovation, and our own research, suggest that such personal networks may be critical to the success of formal Esprit collaborations [2] . Just how these personal networks function alongside the formal inter-organisational network of collaboration is the subject of the authors' research [3] .
Because the notion of network is so prominent and because so much is expected of networks, it would seem to be important to know more about their characteristics, especially what holds them together and how they function. There is actually some resistance to such inquiry. The network has come to be valued as much for its potential to achieve as for what it actually does achieve. The notion of network breathes new life into old strategy and policy, and revitalises old management methods, all without disturbing any existing structures. The network has assumed mythic qualities and it does not always do to examine myths too closely [4] . This approach to networks is not just intellectually insulting, it is also dangerous. The network is a powerful mechanism, far too powerful to be exploited in ignorance. To understand the mechanism, a combined social network and information economics approach is required. Although the two approaches have spawned quite different literatures, they are not incompatible. This paper will explore the possibility of exploiting this compatibility.
Those whose interests lie in social networks focus on patterns of exchange relationships such as advice and friendship [5] . They think in terms of actors, and of the strong -and weak -ties which bind them [6] . In contrast, economists lead a group of other social scientists who focus on network action -what the actors do rather than what their relationships might be. There would seem to be no clear reason why the interests of these two groups should not be complementary, especially as there is a degree of commonality in their traditions. There is surely a direct line from Lund in Sweden and Hagerstrand's innovation waves [7] , through Griliches' obsession with hybrid corn [8] , to Rogers' approach to innovation [9] , thence to Leonard-Barton's horizontal diffusion [10] . In this tradition, interest is in what holds networks together, the links among the actors, and this leads to close examination of the actors' characteristics. Thus, the size of firms, or the educational background of their managers, are associated with the speed and extent of innovation diffusion among them.
At Uppsala, another Swedish tradition is largely responsible for the development of the economics of information, a branch of economics that has found acceptance by the discipline a gruelling and protracted process. Information economics is founded on the observation that information is fundamentally different from other economic goods and, though essential to any economy, is badly handled by both market and organisation. Economics has always avoided too much concern with externalities, and its determination to remain academic has discouraged too much interest in what happens within the organisation -what Lamberton calls a 'black box' mentality [11] . At the macro level, the failure of economics to take information seriously has discouraged the formulation of national information policy: at the micro level, management studies rather than economics has been left to examine, as best it can, the organisation's information strategy. This same failure has left information economics on the periphery of the economics discipline, and the Uppsala school isolated for more than three decades [12] . Individual economists, particularly von Hippel, investigate the link between innovation and the trading, barter and exchange of information, but their work is detached both from the disciplinary core of economics and from the social networks approach [13] . Inevitably, though, it leads on to consideration of the network as a system which facilitates the exchange of information, a mechanism powerful enough to effect information transactions rather than mere information transfer.
The paper has a further five sections. First, Esprit is presented as the context within which are studied both personal and inter-organisational networks of UK main contractors to the program. Secondly, the social network approach is presented with the focus on issues underlying the study of personal and informal networks. Thirdly, the relevance of the economic network approach is considered. Fourthly, a case study of a UK Esprit main contractor is presented and analysed in the light of the previous discussion. The last section draws some conclusions and highlights some implications for theory and policy.
Esprit
European Commission (EC) funding for collaborative research in IT started in 1983. Since then, Esprit has received funding within the four Framework Programmes of the EC in successive phases (Esprit I: 1983-87, Esprit II: 1987-90, Esprit III: 1990-94 and Esprit IV: 1994-99). The program has evolved a great deal in its 17 years (note that some of the projects funded in late 1998 will run until 2000-01). Aims and objectives have been changed again and again, following developments in the world's IT industry, and in response to the interests of a large number of stakeholders in industry, academia and both national and European governments [14] . Within the Fifth Framework Programme (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , the EC has launched the Information Society Technologies Programme, shifting the emphasis of collaborative R&D towards users and bringing together all the programs concerned with IT and related technologies (Esprit, Telematics and Acts). Table 1 provides basic Esprit statistics -average project cost, average number of partners per project, and total funding to the end of the program in 1999. In all, 3,484 projects have been completed, or are near completion. Average project cost has consistently fallen from approximately Euro 6 million to less than Euro 1 million. This reflects changes behind Esprit thinking, especially since the early 1990s, when a shift from large-scale research took place. The average number of partners per project rose from approximately five in Esprit I to nine in Esprit II. The average fell to seven and then to five for Esprit III and IV respectively. To some extent, this pattern was a product of the Commission's aim in the late 1980s to support large collaborations involving as many partners as possible. In the 1990s, smaller budgets reduced the average size of collaboration and new emphasis was placed on including small and medium size firms in these. More than Euro 5.5 billion (or USD 5 billion) has been spent in the 17 years of the Esprit program, and there has been much competition for this funding. Fewer than 20 per cent of proposals submitted have been funded [15] . A fundamental rule for participation in the Esprit program has always been that proposals entail the collaboration of at least two organisations in two EU member countries. Organisations find collaborators for proposals in various ways. Some have been collaborating with their Esprit partners for many years [16] , while others find partners casually through friends of friends. Information about potential partners is now provided on the EU Cordis database on the web [17] . The Commission has also set up national Esprit contact points and regularly holds Esprit information days in Brussels and other European cities. Large boards are provided at these on which hundreds of putative partners post notices and cards advertising their availability [18] . In addition, the European Information Technology Conference has long been a contact point where academics, government officials and industry researchers meet annually.
Social networks
According to Wasserman and Faust, social network methods focus on dyads (two actors and their ties), triads (three actors and their ties), or larger systems (subgroups, as well as entire networks of different actors) [19] . As a result, different sets of actors and network ties have to be analysed to make sense of the structure of a social system. Social network analysis is defined as a method of research for understanding the structure in a social system. Rogers defines structure as the arrangement of actors in a social system and the set of relations that link these actors [20] . Thus, structure deals not only with the actors forming a social system, but also with the relations (linkages, connections, ties) among the actors. The structure which social network analysis brings to light is mostly invisible to the participants in a system because individuals (or other actors) generally know only their own connections and do not have an overview of all the connections that make up the system. Social network analysts such as Wellman propose two alternatives for the study of such 'deep' structures [21] . The first views social networks much as astronomers view the universe -as outside observers studying relations connecting all members of a system. The second view is that of particular individuals, revealing egocentric, personal networks -a 'Ptolemaic view' of social networks as they are perceived by the individual actors at their centres. Esprit collaborations can be explored through social network analysis of patterns of linkages between and among Esprit actors. These actors are of two sorts. First, organisations -formal Esprit partners -are tied together by contracts issued by the EC for particular Esprit projects. Secondly, there are individuals, many of them employees of formal partner organisations, who exchange information relevant to Esprit projects and thus contribute to Esprit innovation. It follows that Esprit collaborations may also be divided into two types: formal inter-organisational networks, and personal, mostly informal, social networks among individuals. Table 2 presents this typology of formal and informal Esprit actor networks. It should be possible to draw a global map of all Esprit project networks, although the huge number of Esprit projects makes an astronomer's view of the Esprit universe very complicated indeed [22] . The complexity becomes impossible to handle when the research moves from the macro-economic, organisational level, to the micro-social, individual level, of analysis. So, Ptolemaic views of Esprit actor networks are unavoidably partial in nature. Moreover, people often move among teams, departments and organisations during Esprit projects. As a result, personal egocentric network maps may be very time-specific. However, personal networks reveal how economic action within and across organisational boundaries is structurally embedded in the social networks of individual actors [23] .
Sociologists have put considerable effort into explaining how organisations, and in particular key individuals within organisations, build networks and alliances based on their previous direct and indirect ties. For example, Gulati and Gargiulo argue that organisational decision makers, facing the uncertainty that usually stems from the scarcity of information about the true capabilities and expectations of potential partners, rely on their personal networks of past partnerships to guide their future alliance decisions [24] . Thus, the creation of new ties is often heavily dependent on direct contact in the past with individuals deemed trustworthy [25] . In this sense, personal networks play a critical role in the development of new inter-organisational networks, enhancing the capacity of the latter to shape subsequent alliance decisions. Burt has also highlighted the significance of personal informal ties in providing organisations with not only trustworthy 'first hand' information, but also access to timely information in relation to new projects, and referrals to other organisations in a potential partnership [26] . Where there is particular uncertainty about potential partners because of geographical, language and cultural barriers, there is an even greater need for a common history of partners and indirect ties to common third parties. This system also deters opportunism as any bad behaviour from any partner is easily reported to other common partners [27] .
Structural holes and weak ties have been highlighted as critical characteristics of social networks for building comparative advantage in an increasingly globalised and competitive marketplace [28] . Structural hole theory suggests that actors who occupy brokerage positions between cohesive groups enjoy comparative advantages in negotiating relations which allow them to know about more opportunities and to secure more favourable terms in the opportunities they choose to pursue. Weak ties theory has put forward a similar argument, pointing out the importance of relationships between actors who are embedded in separate but cohesive groups. For example, if the weak tie between actors A and B is removed, then there is no possibility of information exchange between the two teams in the network shown in Weak ties can therefore link separate individuals, groups or organisations, thereby creating whole new technological communities [29] . Low density networks of weak ties rather than strong ties often have a significant value in terms of greater information diversity. In larger social systems, such as entire communities, weak ties may also play key bridging roles that give birth to greater integration. The observation is similar to Blau's broader sociological argument that: ".....since intimate relations tend to be confined to small and closed social circles... they fragment society into small groups. The integration of these groups in society depends on people's weak ties, not their strong ones, because weak ties extend beyond intimate circles and establish the inter-group connections on which macro-social integration rests." [30] Of course, the distinction between strong and weak ties is often unclear: what is weak and what is strong is not only relative, but also dependent on context.
Silicon Valley is perhaps the context in which the importance of social networks in high technology innovation is most appreciated [31] . It is widely accepted that firms both cooperate and compete in this environment, and that social networks allow the speed and extent of innovation the market requires while making possible yet faster and greater innovation. Furthermore, it is accepted that much of this networking is informal, involving personal links, and that informal networks are particularly efficient in securing the exchange of information required for rapid and radical innovation [32] . What is not well understood, even in an area as investigated as Silicon Valley, is the relationship between the actors who comprise these networks, and the function by which information is provided for innovation. Though the Silicon Valley myth has been a powerful influence in forcing analysis of the networking behind high technology innovation [33] , even here the social network approach remains distinct from the economic network approach [34] .
Economic networks
Economics is concerned with the allocation of resources and it is strange that the discipline has not given more attention to one of the most precious of resources, information. Those who have provided justification for a distinct sub-discipline in information economics have insisted that information is very different indeed from other economic goods. The magnitude and nature of this difference justifies the distinction of information economics: the importance of information in the economy justifies the influence that information economics should have on economics as a whole. And yet, despite the crusading efforts of many of the best brains that economics has had to offer [35] -an inordinate proportion of whom seem to have gone on to Nobel prizesinformation economics has been given only slow and grudging recognition and even now, in the midst of the Information Age, the Information Economy and the Information Society, is afforded but a small part in serious economics.
This may explain why the interest of economics in networks seems to have sprung not from information economics and the importance of the network in effecting information transactions, but from notions of a new form of organisation lying somewhere between the market and the hierarchy of the organisation (see for example [36, 11] ). This could be represented as a network joining together discrete entities to some greater or lesser extent. For this purpose, the form of the network is rather more important than its function. Never fond of externalities, economics uses the notion of network to internalise what would otherwise remain external to the organisation [37] . Even the virtual organisation can be internalised by the judicious application of the network notion [38] . Yet, a more radical alternative to markets and hierarchies would seem to be required when neither can be relied upon to deal efficiently with the allocation of resources. Such conditions pertain when dealing with information in that market failure seems to be as likely as organisational failure. Even so, just why the network is capable of reducing the likelihood of either failure is not a problem that besets most economists. The advantages are accepted without too much concern for how they accrue. Chief among these advantages is probably innovation.
There is much more interest in economics, and in related disciplines, in the innovation produced by networks than in how this comes about. Antonelli, for example, sees the main purpose of firm networks as innovation; how innovation is achieved is of secondary importance, though network function clearly entails actors receiving market signals more complex than mere price [39] . Any further function is explained in terms of the network drawing together complementary factors. Information is attributed no specific importance except as one of these factors, and as a good which can spill over from one network member to another [40] . In management studies, the use of the verb 'to network' reduces the function of the network to its mere existence. One consequence is the assumption that networks produce innovation simply because they are networks, and that a network of any sort will produce innovation. Networks are depicted as compensating for the inadequacies of individual members: thus, small firms or small countries need not worry about their individual deficiencies as long as they network [41] . Indeed, it can be further assumed that innovation -even a reputation for innovationindicates the existence of networks responsible for the innovation. Thus, the innovation of Silicon Valley is always assumed to be generated by its networks, despite evidence that this is not always the case [42] . Similarly, the very existence of Japanese innovation is enough to confirm the responsibility of the country's networks; no further evidence is required [43] . In fact, the complexity of network arrangements may actually be inappropriate to the essential simplicity of innovation [44] .
The notion of the network as generator of innovation has been accompanied by a growing objection to simple, organisation-bound models of technological change, and growing acceptance of management methods which direct firms to be closer to their suppliers and especially their customers. But simple replacement of technology push by market pull does not yield an innovation model of much greater sophistication than a model in which innovation springs from R&D, and is just as linear. Thus it is that the work of von Hippel [45] , an economist but of the Rogers and Hagerstrand tradition, is interpreted not as research into how networks function, but as a simple injunction that firms should have good links with their customers and suppliers [46] . When there is so little concern with how networks function, any of the vast variety of extra-and interorganisational relationships into which firms have thrown themselves since the 1980s can be seen as networking. The result of this interest in the appropriate form for innovation rather than the appropriate function may well be reduced innovation [47] .
The neglect of function in the study of networks, and the neglect of information in the study of economics make possible the assumption that networks are inherently information networks and that all permit information transactions [48] . It follows that telecommunications networks, because of their obvious connection with information, must be particularly suited to effecting information transactions. There is understandable confusion between networks which facilitate information transactions and telecommunications networks. After all, if the latter do not make possible information transactions, what do they do? Information transfer may be all that occurs -the movement of information from one place to another. Though information transfer is an essential part of information transactions, it is not necessarily the case that a network which facilitates information transfer also facilitates information transactions. In fact, the conditions which are conducive to information transfer may actually discourage information transactions. Thus it is that many managers choose not to rely on electronic systems for the information of most importance to their companies [49] , and that gatekeepers -those who bring external information into the organisation and translate it for internal use -do not rely on e-mail [50] .
Where there is interest in the functioning of networks, there is often also interest in their informality. The most visible networks tend to be the most formal and institutionalalliances of major companies, for instance, or the collaborations of Esprit. The nature of information dictates that it cannot be traded as other economic goods, and that institutional links are unlikely to overcome the barriers presented by these characteristics [51] . Formal networks cope well enough with packaged and codified information of the sort which can be easily labelled and valued, but they struggle with irregular and tacit information from unusual sources. Here the informal information network comes into its own. Not only does it effect information transactions more efficiently than institutional networks, but it deals with the tacit information which cannot be captured in contracts and yet is fundamental to innovation [52] .
The problem is that the informal information network may be in conflict with the formal network. Informal information exchange requires that individuals trade in information (including their employer's information) on their own behalf. The organisation, if it benefits at all, does so only indirectly and probably not immediately [53] . It is not surprising that many organisations cavil at this uncontrolled, unsupervised, loss of what they are encouraged to see as their key resource. Their senior managers are generally convinced that competitive advantage comes from securing information within the organisation; innovation from exploiting information within the organisation. Information coming into the organisation may be acceptable, but every effort must be made to ensure that no information leaves. This is no basis for the information exchange fundamental to the informal information network: information will not be received unless other information is given [54] .
A primary concern of economics is the nature of organisation; the primary concern of management studies is what managers do within organisations. Neither is particularly concerned with a network feature which is non-organisational and which cannot be controlled by managers [55] . There are alternative, formal notions of network which sit much more comfortably with established ideas of organisation and its management. Within management studies, attitudes towards the role of information in the organisation are totally in conflict with network exchange of information. Within the organisation, information is critical to modern management methods as something to be shared rather than exchanged; sharing denotes teamwork, pulling together, marching to the same drumbeat, singing from the same hymn sheet [56] . There is nothing here of the careful dealing in information so fundamental to information networks. Moreover, if the information from network exchange is essential for innovation, and network exchange of information is essentially informal, logic suggests that managers might reassess their efforts to manage innovation.
"As a result, and against the common logic of text book business administrative rules, if management wants to increase its innovative activity, and if it relies on self-regulating innovation and creativity mechanism, it has to provide slack." [57] Acceptance of the importance of information exchange in informal networks implies that innovation cannot be managed by method, any more than effective information networks can be imposed by authority -a conclusion which many academics, and probably most policy makers and managers, would find too awful even to contemplate.
Case study: ARM Ltd.
Advanced Risc Machines (ARM) is a world leader in microprocessor cores and peripherals for computing, communications and consumer electronics applications [58] . ARM's products are used in ISDN telecommunications equipment, video games, palmtop organisers and networked computers. From a start-up company with a 12-person research team in 1991, the company grew rapidly to employ 160 people in 1996, and 350 people in early 1999, with sites in Cambridge, London, Munich, Paris, Los Gatos in California, Austin in Texas, and Tokyo. From 1991 the company increased revenues at a compound annual rate of 78%, resulting in sales of USD 28 million, and profit before tax of USD 6.5 million in 1996. The company has been involved in 14 Esprit projects so far, of which seven are on going in Esprit IV. ARM has been the main contractor and coordinator in about half of them. Typically, ARM will be involved in an Esprit collaboration as technology provider, together with a software house, an equipment manufacturer and an end-user to exert the necessary market pull. Esprit has helped ARM in the early stages of its development with vital seed funding as well as with developing links with original equipment manufacturers, end users and universities. With the Department of Computer Science at Manchester University, ARM has created the world's first asynchronous computer chip -Amulet [59] . It has taken out patents on Amulet and intends exploiting them in future products. Informal networks are critical to ARM's innovation and are judiciously assembled.
"Because things are changing so fast, you will pick up the best contacts you have from a job in the next project, maybe the devil you know... You will go back, look at the guys who worked well... you get the new guys that you need.... so I don't think that you would carry forward the same network through this fast changing process. I think you would review it and I think that is what we are describing we do. We are reviewing the situation who we wish to work with and it is more likely to contain people we have worked with in the past and know well than a new one because the risk is lower." (ARM manager) ARM managers are anxious that their networks consist of people sufficiently like-minded to communicate, and yet sufficiently different to produce the unpredictable.
"The value of networking is that you don't build a network of people that don't know what you are doing. We don't get people who manufacture cheese into an IT project is the silly way of putting it. We have got people of a like mind, that is the first thing that networking does.... X is a product that came out of a very significant piece of work done by a side group in a European project about things in a completely uncontrolled way... Yes, it is a spin off... spin off which you cannot predict and has actually been very identifiable and beneficial and it is a bit strange... we were not working on that... we were working on a different aspect of the problem .... You could argue that it was a result of the first problem that you thought of, and you could equally argue it was not... so EF brought in Hagenuk, at the end because this other company (TKI) fell out. Hagenuk met ARM and started to use ARM a lot. In the project was TG (a university professor at Manchester University) on an asynchronous version of the ARM design. Hagenuk started thinking about that. Suddenly they discovered that the Manchester design performed well and you have a collaboration between Manchester and Hagenuk that definitely was not intended at the start of the project." (ARM manager) The link between TG and ARM is personal, broad and dates back to before ARM was set up in 1991. Similarly, what ARM managers value in the company's formal collaboration with its partners takes time to develop, something which the European Commission does not always seem to appreciate. "This German company (Hagenuk Telekom) approached us to say they were interested in using the technology in telecom controls. So they came to us... We worked together in a previous [Esprit] project.... which gave them some confidence in us, which meant that they approached us for the next project [Amulet] where we actually worked together. I think there is a very important lesson in that: Esprit trying to enforce collaboration in projects and trying to get everybody working on saying yes... What has worked for us is to be in a project with potential collaborators but working on different things, and watching each other, and then, when we recognise there was some synergy because we had been working in the same project we had the mutual confidence and trust that we work together in the next project. If we had been required to be collaborating and working on the same thing in the first project we would probably never have got together. They would have not known us. We would have not known them. Before you marry somebody you have a period of engagement, you meet, you go to parties together. In a sense, Esprit has sometimes felt like it was trying to force people into marriages before they actually got to know each other." (ARM manager) So partners need time to know each other before they commit themselves to a formal collaboration. In Esprit, this can be difficult [60] . It is instructive to analyse a Ptolemaic view of the Amulet project network. Personal network data were collected from TG at Manchester University (see Figure 2) , who identified individuals who had supplied him with information of importance to the Amulet project. As was expected, TG nominated first NM at ARM, and two engineers (LF and XP) at Hagenuk Telekom. Each of these three reciprocated the personal tie to TG. Additionally, LF nominated NM at ARM, and XP nominated three experts in the Amulet group at Manchester University. Overall the pattern of relational data of TG's personal network shows three highly interconnected cohesive subgroups at Manchester, Hagenuk Telekom and ARM with no connection to other organisations outside the formal Esprit collaboration. The entire Amulet project network is shown in Table 3 . Twelve companies and universities participate in this formal Esprit collaboration. TG, however, has personal connections with only a quarter of the partner organisations in Amulet. He has no important information links with partners in France and Italy, and no links with many UK partners, including academics at UMIST (University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology) next door. The methodology employed above is not sufficiently robust to capture all the strong and weak ties of individuals. These individuals are clear that there is an international community of two to three hundred people working in the area of asynchronous logic and low power problems. 
Conclusion
Whatever the importance of informal networks in innovation, they are nearly always assumed to be subsidiary to formal networks. The Esprit example presented here is typical; without the formal, it is argued, the informal could not exist. Informal networks are nebulous: formal networks part of the real world, in Esprit a function of the demands of evaluation, audit and compulsory collaboration, itself part of the requirements of politics and unreconstructed science policy. If it is accepted that both formal and informal networks are important for innovation, then it must also be accepted that they are unlikely to assert their influence on innovation independently. The networks are presumably interdependent, but whether they are in conflict or in harmony remains to be seen. Were the informal links as evident as the formal, it might be possible to conclude that it was around these that the formal links of Esprit had been formed, that the formal emerged from the informal. The proposition remains to be tested, and the testing will be the more effective for taking a dual approach, looking both at what binds networks together and at the transactions fundamental to the functioning of information networks [61] . Without this dual approach, exploiting both social network theory and information economics, all that are apparent are the networks of formal collaboration and the claims for the many benefits this collaboration brings in terms of innovation.
The strength and inflexibility of disciplinary boundaries do not encourage this dual approach. Nor does it help that the Swedish academic world in which both traditions are rooted constantly has to defend its distinction against bombardment by dominant US traditions [62] . It may also be relevant that the network concept has become so powerful that a better understanding of what networks are and how they work might actually reduce its value for government policy and corporate strategy in that the knowledge would restrict the flexibility with which the concept could be applied. Knowing more about what networks do would inevitably reveal more about what they do not.
